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"I MAY NOT KNOW ART, BUT
I KNOW WHAT I'LL PAY FOR": THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE
IN ARTS FUNDING FOLLOWING NATIONAL ENDOWAMEIr
FOR THE ARTS V. FINLEY
Elizabeth Megen Ray"
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech."'
"[Flirst [A]mendment doctrine is neither clear nor logical. It is
a vast Sargasso Sea of drifting and entangled values, theories,
rules, exceptions, predilections."2
I. INTRODUCTION: DOES THE GOVERNMENT BELONG
IN THE ARTS BUSINESS?
At best, government ftmding of the arts creates an uneasy
and precarious alliance. At worst, government involvement in
the arts poses a danger of censorship so great that some are
tempted to analogize Congress's imposing conditions on the
National Endowment for the Arts' ("NEA"} awarding of grants
to Hitler's effect on developing art in Weimar Germany. Su-
preme Court precedent which condones the government's
right to place conditions on funding for the arts starldy con-
trasts with other precedents that unforgivingly condemn gov-
ernment regulations which disadvantage one viewpoint as
compared to another. In choosing to establish a national
presence in arts funding, Congress placed itself in a First
Amendment no-man's land, pitting the right to condition a
- J.D. Candidate. 2000, University of Pennsylvania Law School: B.A. Psychology.
1997 Harvard University. This comment is dedicated to my mother, Julie Ray. with
special thanks to Professor Ed Baker and also Andrew M. Baer and John H. Scha-
piro for their assistance in editing and revising this piece.
' U. S. CoNsT. amend. I (constitutionally protecting the freedom of speech).
2 Robert C. Post, Racist Speech. Democracy, and the First Amendment. 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 267, 278 (1991) (describing the interpretive effort to develop a set of
principles for evaluating regulations of racist speech).3 See Renee Linton, The Artistic Votce: Is It in Danger of Being Silenced?. 32 CAL
W. L. REV. 195, 222-23 (1995) (describing Hitler's degradation and destruction of un-
conventional art in the 1930's).
JOURNAL OF CONS7TIIONAL LAW
grant as upheld in Rust v. Sullivan4 against the duty not to
disadvantage unpopular viewpoints as elucidated in Rosen-
berger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia.
Recently, public outcry over the funding of controversial
art, which had begun to simmer in 1990, found its way to the
Supreme Court in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finleyo.
In Finley, the Court upheld a 1990 amendment to legislation
authorizing the NEA that dictated that decency must be
"tak[en] into consideration" when awarding funds. While the
Court simply concluded that Congress's right to condition an
award did not create an impermissible danger of suppression
via viewpoint discrimination, 8 the decision may have practical
repercussions for the integrity of artistic expression desperate
to qualify for grant money. While the dejure versus defacto
censorship debate will undoubtedly fill journal pages for some
time into the future, the effect of the majority decision in
Finley will be relegated to the position of mere speculation
until legal historians can capitalize on years of hindsight.
The more pressing question which Finley brings to the
fore, is whether a comfortable solution can be reached at the
nexus of the arts, Congress, and the First Amendment. If
First Amendment jurisprudence as explicated in Rust permits
conditioning governmental awards, and if artistic expression
cannot resist the temptation to conform to Congressional
conditions on grant monies,9 then perhaps Finley signals the
need to examine the wisdom of federal involvement in funding
the arts at all. Although held to be constitutional, the de-
cency and respect provisions of the 1990 amendment to the
National Endowment for the Arts enabling act do pose a dan-
ger of viewpoint discrimination. However, Congress's right to
condition the grants trumped this concern, which was nebu-
lous at best given the opaque language of the amendment.
4 500 U.S. 173 (1990) (upholding regulations prohibiting grantees under Title X
of the Public Health Service Act from counseling or advocating abortion as a method
of family planning).
5 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (finding unconstitutional the terms and applications of
guidelines used by the University of Virginia to withhold payment out of its Student
Activities Fund for printing costs of a Christian student group).6 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (upholding Congress's right to condition awards under the
NEA based on "decency").
Id. at 572. The amendment, part of the NEA's 1990 reauthorization bill, be-
came 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1).
8 Id. at 583. While the Court noted that section 954(d)(1) might potentially be
applied in a manner suppressing unpopular viewpoints, It refrained from dealing
with such a problem until it arose.
9 See id. at 606 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("'The inextricability of indecency from
expression,' is beyond dispute in a certain amount of entirely lawful artistic enter-
prise. Starve the mode, starve the message.") (quoting Denver Area Educ. Tele-
comms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 805 (1996)).
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Because the Court distinguished between selectively funding
art and regulating it, ° the decency and respect provisions did
not call down the full force of jurisprudential disdain for
viewpoint discrimination in the First Amendment realm. As a
result, the artistic and legal world must choose between a
vague danger of discrimination or forsaking federal grant
money. For those unable to accept any limits to the artistic
voice, Finley signals the possible need to end goverment
funding of the arts. While viscerally the thought of censoring
an artist's personal expression is anathema, one cannot ar-
gue the position against censorship with the same moral
force while simultaneously recognizing that these "oppressed"
artists are voluntarily seeking a share in the government's
coffers. When Congress proactively decides to enter the ar-
tistic realm, "censorship" as an outgrowth of the need to de-
cide how to allocate limited funds must realistically be ex-
pected.
This Comment will examine the friction that is inherent in
a situation where the government, the artist, and the First
Amendment are the key players. The first section introduces
the reader to the development of the National Endowment for
the Arts, the recent problems surrounding indecent and ob-
scene art, and the specifics that resulted in the present liti-
gation. Part Two continues with a detailed discussion of the
reasoning of the Supreme Court's (majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions) recent decision to enable the reader to
gain a firm understanding of the minute points of law which
dictated the outcome of the case. With this detail in mind,
Part Three explores Finley in the context of Rust and Rosen-
berger, two recent Supreme Court decisions, one of which
virtually predetermines the outcome of Finley and the other of
which strongly counsels that Finley's lone dissenter" con-
tributed the most to the jurisprudential debate. In conclu-
sion, Part Four considers the possible and probable effects of
Finley on the arts and suggests possible alternatives to gov-
ernmental participation therein.
A. The Historical Background of the NEA
1. The Politics of Art in the Sixties
In order to appreciate the full repercussions of Finley, one
must be able to place both the decision and the history and
10 Id. at 588-90 (noting that a regulatory scheme with similar terms might invoke
valenless concerns).
Justice Souter was the lone dissenter in Finley.
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development of the National Endowment for the Arts in con-
text. Responding to both the cultural upheaval of the 1960s
and the general belief that the United States was lagging be-
hind other countries which had already established systems
for goverment-supported art programs, Congress created the
National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities,12 which
served as the umbrella agency for the National Endowment
for the Arts, in 1965.3
The NEA was originally created with the lofty ideals of
supporting works of "artistic and cultural significance, giving
emphasis to American creativity and cultural diversity,""professional excellence," and the encouragement of "public
knowledge, education, understanding, and appreciation of
the arts."14 To allay fears that Congress was laying the em-
bryonic foundation for the creation of an Orwellian govern-
ment art, the NEA emphasized "both the private sector's tra-
ditional role in promoting the arts and principles of artistic
freedom." 5
2. The Explosion of Controversy
For twenty-five years, the NEA enjoyed a relatively peaceful
and litigation-free existence.16 However, scandal and outrage
erupted with the public displays of Robert Mapplethorpe's
The Perfect Moment and Andres Serrano's Piss Christ.7 The
latter work consisted of a photograph of a plastic crucifix
suspended in a jar of the artist's urine; the former was a col-
lection of photographs, some of which depicted naked men
engaging in homosexual activities. 8 Both of these works had
12 See Thomas P. Leff, The Arts: A Traditional Sphere of Free Epression? First
Amendment Implications of Government Funding to the Arts in the Aftermath of Rust v.
Sullivan, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 353, 363 (1995) (recounting the establishment of the
NEA).
13 Id.
14 20 U.S.C. §§ 954(c)(1), 954(5) (1990). See also Jesse Helms, Is It Art or Tax-Paid
Obscenity? The NEA Controversy, 2 J.L. & POL'Y 99, 101 (1994) ('The individuals re-
sponsible for the NEA's creation sought to establish an organization which would
support projects with substantial artistic and cultural significance In order to en-
courage the development, appreciation and enjoyment of the arts.").i5 Leff, supra note 12, at 364.
6 Id. at 366-67. In 1984, leaders from the Italian-American community criticized
a performance of Puccini's Rigoletto by the English National Opera at the Metropoli-
tan Opera in New York, partially underwritten by an NEA touring program grant.
Also, in 1985, controversy arose over an NEA-funded publication of allegedly porno-
graphic poetry. Notwithstanding these isolated incidents, NEA grants had continued
without creating much public stir. Id.
17 See Lee C. Bollinger, Public Institutions of Culture and the First Amendment. The
New Frontler, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1103, 1103-04 (1995) (discussing the reaction of
politicians, the public and the artistic community).18 Id.
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received funding through the NEA." Responding to the pub-
lic outcry, Congress considered courses of action that in-
cluded disabling the NEA entirely," severely cutting its fund-
ing,21 and creating standards and/or criteria for receiving
monetary awards.
B. The 1989 and 1990 Amendments
The most vocal critic of the NEA was Senator Jesse
Helms, 3 who likened the works of some NEA grantees to child
pornography.2' Angered by the fact that the NEA had dared
to award grants to works of art which were so offensive to the
"Judeo-Christian foundations of our nation,"2 Helms prof-
fered an amendment which would greatly limit the ability of
the NEA to award grants on the basis of "artistic merit" alone.
The 1989 proposed amendment provided:
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to this
Act may be used to promote, disseminate, or produce: (1) ob-
scene or indecent materials, including but not limited to depic-
tions of sadomasochism, homo-eroticism, the exploitation of
children, or individuals engaged in sex acts; or (2) material which
denigrates the objects or beliefs of the adherents of a particular
religion or non-religion; or (3) material which denigrates, de-
bases, or reviles a person, group, or class of citizens on the basis
19 The NEA awarded a total of $45,000 to the two works. See Michael Wingfleld
Walker, Artistic Freedom v. Censorship: The Aftermath of the NEA's New Fumdlng Re-
sfrictions, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 937, 942 (1993).
Id. at 942-43 (noting that Representative Dana Rohrabacher proposed abolish-
in4 the NEA entirely).
' Id. (pointing out that Representative Charles Stenhoim proposed cutting the
NEA's budget by $45,000. the exact amount of the Mapplethorpe and Serrano
awards).
Id. (noting that Senator Jesse Helms proposed a ban on 'obscene or indecent
materials").
Senator Helms offered several proposed amendments to the NEA grant-making
process and argued that the citizens of the United States did not support Serrano's
or Mapplethorpe's art. See Bollinger. supra note 17. at 1104 (Senator Jesse Helms
waged a legislative campaign to restrict the grant-making powers of the NEA.): see
also Helms, supra note 14, at 99:
America is in the midst of a cultural war. On one side are those of us who
want to keep our nation rooted in Judeo-Christian morality. On the other, are
those who would discard this traditional morality in favor of a radical moral
relativism. It is nothing less than a struggle for the soul of our nation. How
this controversy is resolved will determine whether America will succeed and
prosper, or be left in the dustbin of history.
Id.
24 See Helms, supra note 14, at 100 ('The NEA gave tax dollars to support this
publication claiming such photographs have 'artistic merit', despite the fact that
Congress had previously enacted legislation to prevent such sexual exploitation of
children... ").
25 See id. at 101.
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of race, creed, sex, handicap, age or national origin.2 6
Congress eventually enacted a much weaker version of
Helms' original amendment. That 1989 amendment prohib-
ited the NEA from using federal funds for the promotion or
production of art that, in the judgment of the NEA "'may be
considered obscene, including depictions of sadomasochism,
homo-eroticism, the sexual exploitation of children or indi-
viduals engaged in sex acts.... 2 7
The result of the 1989 amendment was the addition of an
"obscenity pledge"28 to the application for NEA funds. Essen-
tially, artists applying for NEA grant monies signed a form,
which promised that the work the artist was to create would
not be obscene.29 Greatly angered by this development, the
art community first responded with protests0 and finally liti-
gation.3 The obscenity oath was struck down as violative of
the First Amendment freedom of expression, as well as being
unconstitutionally vague, because no definition of "obscene"
had been provided by the statute.32 Congress responded to
this decision with a second 1990 amendment. In addition to
stating that "obscenity" was to be measured by the test set
forth in Miller v. California,33 the 1990 amendment added sec-
tion 954(d)(1), which has come to be known as the "decency
clause."3" Section 954(d)(1) requires that "artistic excellence
and artistic merit are the criteria by which grant applications
are judged, taking into consideration general standards of de-
cency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the
26 Helms, supra note 14, at 103 (citing 135 CONG. REC. S8807 (daily ed. July 26,
1989) (statement of Sen. Helms)).
27 Id. (quoting Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 340, 103 Stat. 741 (1990)).
See Walker, supra note 19, at 944.
29 Id.
30 See id. at 945, (citing Michael Himmelman, Leonard Bernstein Refuses the
Medal of Arts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1989, at C26).
31 See Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 782 (C.D.
Cal. 1991) (invalidating the obscenity oath provision as unconstitutional for vague-
ness in violation of the Fifth Amendment).
32 See id. ("There must be a statute specifically defining the sexual conduct the
depiction or description of which is forbidden."); see also Walker, supra note 19, at
946 ("The deciding factor was that the pledge left the definition of obscenity com-
pletely under the NEA's control.").
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1972). In Miller, the Court announced a tripartite test to be
used in determining whether a work would be considered obscene:
(a) whether the "average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards," would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest... ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by state law, and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
Id. (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)).
Walker, supra note 19, at 950-51.
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American public...."5
C. Background of Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts
Karen Finley, John Fleck, Holly Hughes, and Tim Miller
initiated the Finley litigation in California as a challenge to
the NEA's denial of grant money.' The First Amendment
challenge to the decency clause as violative of the right to
freedom of expression and the Fifth Amendment challenge for
overbreadth and vagueness were added after the initial com-
mencement of the suit.' Both the District Court for the
Central District of California and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that section 954(d)(1) was unconstitutional."
II. THE SUPREME COURr REVERSAL:
THE DECENCY STANDARD IS CONSTITUTIONAL
A. Justice O'Connor's Majority Opinion
1. Viewpoint discrimination
While both lower courts found the Decency Clause to be
violative of the artists' constitutional rights in freedom of ex-
pression and had given little weight to the government's abil-
ity to condition a grant,m the Supreme Court upheld the
clause as constitutional, because it did not serve as an ab-
solute bar,' and because the government could rightfully
place conditions on a grant of public money." To fully appre-
ciate the import of Finley, one must understand the linchpins
of the Court's reasoning. To that end, a detailed explanation
is set forth below.
In what has been criticized as a technicality-based deci-
sion,' the Finley Court held that 20 U.S.C. § 954 (d)(1) was
35 See 20 U.S.C. § 954 (d)(1) (1993).
Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts. 795 F. Supp. 1457. 1460 (C.D. Cal.
1992) [hereinafter Finley ].
Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts. 524 U.S. 569. 577-78 (1998) [here-
inafter Finley M].
38 See Finley L 795 F. Supp. 1457. 1476 ('The court grants the plaintiffs mo-
tion... on the grounds that the 'decency' clause ... is void for vagueness under the
Fifth Amendment and is overbroad under the First Amendment.": Finley v. National
Endowment for the Arts. 100 F.3d 671, 683-84 (9th Cir. 1996) ('The 'decency and
respect" provision of § 954(d)(1) is void.., under the Fifth [and First Amendments]."}
[hereinafter FinLey/a.
39 Finley I, 100 F.3d at 681-83: Finley L 795 F. Supp. at 1463-64.
40 See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 581 ('It is clear, however, that the text of § 954 im-
poses no categorical requirement).
41 See id. at 585.
42 See American Civil Liberties Union Freedom Network Release June 25. 1998
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not facially invalid as impermissible viewpoint discrimination
nor was it void for vagueness under the First Amendment.'
Relying on a close reading of the statutory text, Justice
O'Connor concluded that the much criticized decency clause
was a consideration, but not a necessary condition to be met
before the National Endowment for the Arts could award
grant money." Comparing 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) to §
954(d)(2), Justice O'Connor explained that Congress had cre-
ated a categorical prohibition in the case of obscene art (sec-
tion 954(d)(2)), and that it could just as easily have created
an absolute decency requirement or indecency bar.4  As
written, section 954(d)(1) only requires that the NEA consider
decency, not make its ultimate decision based on it.
In addition to analyzing the specific language of section
954(d)(1), Justice O'Connor considered the political atmos-
phere in which the amendment was passed. The decency
clause resulted from a bipartisan proposal introduced as a
counter-offer to amendments aimed at eliminating the NEA's
funding entirely or substantially constraining its grant-
making authority. Therefore, the Court concluded that the
clear lack of unconstitutional intent precluded striking the
amendment itself as unconstitutional.4
Distinguishing the holding in Finley from prior case law
which had found governmental regulations containing criteria
that discriminated on the basis of viewpoint to be facially in-
valid, O'Connor indicated that the statute at bar posed no
substantial danger of the suppression of free expression.'
(Jan. 15, 1999) <http://www.aclu.org/news/n062598b.htnil>.
Although the Supreme Court upheld the "decency and respect" criteria im-
posed by Congress on the National Endowment for the Arts [NEA] in 1990, It
did so only by rendering the law to be essentially meaningless.... Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Souter read the law to have the teeth that the ACLU be-
lieves Congress in fact intended....
Id. See also Gene Gaudette, Opinion, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 29, 1998 (Jan. 15, 1999)
<http:// www.esulb.edu/-Jvancamp/intro.htmIl> ('The case was decided on techni-
cal grounds and on a narrow interpretation of the First Amendment.").
4 Finley III, 524 U.S. at 573.
See id. at 581 ("It Is clear... that the text of § 954(d)(1) Imposes no categorical
requirement. The advisory language stands in sharp contrast to congressional ef-
forts to prohibit the funding of certain classes of speech.").
45 Id.
46 Ii.
47 Id. "Furthermore, like the plain language of §954(d), the political context sur-
rounding the adoption of the 'decency and respect' clause is inconsistent with re-
spondents' assertion that the provision compels the NEA to deny funding on the ba-
sis of viewpoint discriminatory criteria." Id. This sojourn into congressional motives
was not without its critics. See id. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The 'political
context...' which the Court discusses at some length... does not change its
meaning or affect its constitutionality.").
48 See id. at 585. Justice O'Connor distinguishes the possible consequences of
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Arguably, the case did not involve a governmental regulation.
Indecent artistic expression was not explicitly condemned,
forbidden, or regulated by section 954(d)(1). Indeed, artists
would continue to enjoy complete freedom to be as offensive
as they wished; however, they could not expect tax dollars to
underwrite their indecent expressions. 9 When patronizing
the arts, the government played a fundamentally different
role than that which it played as sovereign. As a sovereign,
the government regulates, whereas in the role of patron the
government supports or elects not to support the arts. Acting
as a patron of the arts, Congress was free to condition the
grant of money on any criteria it chose.5s
Though the lower courts had balked at the opportunity for
discrimination and censorship that the decency clause pro-
vided, the Court skirted the issue by employing a narrow
statutory construction that hinged on the understanding of
decency as a consideration rather than a criterion.5' The
majority decision has implicitly approved the notion that
Congress may determine that art which deserves public
money, Le. "good art," should be decent, respectable art.
While the decision comports with some strong precedent,
the latent danger of Congress's ability to direct or entice ar-
tistic expression into acceptable channels illustrates that
Congress cannot frictionlessly allocate public funds to the
arts. Just as with its finding regarding viewpoint discrimina-
tion, the majority resoundingly supported the decency clause
in the artists' vagueness challenge.
the decency clause at issue in 954(d)(1) with previous legislation that had been in-
validated by the Court. Specifically, O'Connor distinguishes RAV v. City of St. PauL
505 U.S. 377 (1992). where legislation had been struck down as facially invalid. The
municipal ordinance at issue in RAV had made certain type of unpopular speech
subject to criminal penalty, thereby creating a grave danger of censorship by threat
of imprisonment. No similar penalty was threatened by section 954(d)(1).
49 See Helms. supra note 14, at 104, declaring that:
[Section 954(d)(1)] does not outlaw or ban such art. Because the legislation
did not prevent artists from producing, creating, selling, or displaying so-called
blasphemous or obscene 'art: at their own expense, or at the expense of other
private sponsors, and on their own time, the legislation has in no way 'cen-
sored' any artists.
(emphasis in original).
See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 585 ('Any content-based considerations that many be
taken into account in the grant-maklng process are a consequence of the nature of
arts funding.").
5' This rather cramped reading of the statute, while not incorrect, did Ignore the
very outrage which prompted the amendment. Arguably, the interpretation, while
sound legally, was blind to the realities of the history of the amendment.
52 See analysis of Finley I7 in light of Rust, Part Three. nfra
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2. Vagueness
While lower courts had been troubled by the vagueness of
conditioning grants on a criterion as nebulous as "decency,"
the Court did not believe that the statute's vagueness posed a
constitutional problem. The Court admitted that the decency
provision was not specific, but found the clause's inprecision
did not rise to the level of constitutional severity. In the
Court's view, decency and respect were terms no more vague
than "artistic excellence."' 4 Additionally, there are constitu-
tional applications for the decency and respect prongs of the
enabling statute. One job of the NEA is education; decency is
a permissible factor where "educational suitability" is a con-
sideration.55 When the government is acting as patron and
not as sovereign, the consequences of imprecision are not
constitutionally severe.
Justice O'Connor further reasoned that if this statute were
vague, then so would be all statutes that create federal schol-
arships for "excellence."M Invalidating section 954(d)(1) would
fundamentally challenge the constitutionality of any federal
grant or funding program that placed conditions on the re-
ceipt of funds.5 Such a broadly sweeping decision would
take First Amendment jurisprudence into unprecedented
realms.' Within the realm of federal funding programs, gov-
ernment funding of the arts in particular is especially prone
to the vagaries of subjectivity.5  The Finley majority stated
that artistic merit cannot be objectively quantified.60 In order
for the federal government to fund the arts, citizens must ac-
cept a significant amount of subjectivity. 1
See Finley III, 524 U.S. at 588, noting that:
It]he terms of the provision are undeniably opaque, and if they appeared in a
criminal statute or regulatory scheme, they could raise substantial vagueness
concerns. It is unlikely, however, that speakers will be compelled to steer too
far clear of any 'forbidden area' in the context of grants of this nature.
5 Id. at 584.
55 See id. (citing Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) (invalidating a Board decision to remove certain books
from a school library on ideological grounds)).
See Finley I, 524 U.S. at 589.
57 See id. ("To accept respondents' vagueness argument would be to call into
question the constitutionality of these valuable government programs and countless
others like them.").
Justice Scalia found the First Amendment inapplicable to funding situations
entirely. See id. at 599.
59 See id. at 588 ("Congress may 'selectively fund a program to encourage certain
activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an
alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.'" (quoting
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991))).
See id. at 589 (noting that subjectivity pervades government-granted merit aid).
61 See id.; supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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The funding process is subjectively selective; section 954
merely adds some imprecise considerations, and does not fa-
cialy infringe the First Amendment.6 O'Connor explained
that "[amny content-based considerations that may be taken
into account in the grant-making process are a consequence
of the nature of arts funding. The NEA has limited resources,
and it must deny the majority of the grant applications that it
receives, including many that propose 'artistically excellent'
projects."63 Similarly, she stated that "[the agency may de-
cide to fund particular projects for a wide variety of rea-
sons.... The ' very assumption' of the NEA is that grants will
be awarded according to the 'artistic worth of competing ap-
plicants,' and absolute neutrality is simply 'inconceivable. '" '
In the Court's view, section 954(d)(1) simply takes an "already
subjective selection process" and adds an "imprecise" consid-
eration.6s
The artists challenging the decency clause in Finley had
placed themselves in a challenging procedural position by
waging a full frontal assault on section 954(d)(1). Given the
nature of facial invalidity in general and the overbreadth
doctrine as it applies in First Amendment cases,G7 the Court
concluded that until section 954 is applied in such a way as
to drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace of
ideas, its constitutionality will be upheld. Thus the artists
simply failed to carry their burden.m
3. Congressional Spending and the Power to Condition Grants
Because the decency clause of the NEA's enabling statute
does not infringe on a constitutionally protected right, Con-
gress enjoys wide latitude in its spending power.m  The Court
See d. at 588 (discussing the slight limits that might result due to the vague-
ness of section 954).
63 Id at 585.
Id. at 585-86 (citing Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson. 532 F.2d 792. 795-96
(1st Cir. 1976), cert dented. 429 U.S. 894 (1976)).
W See Finley 11, 524 U.S. at 585.
66 See id. at 580 ("Respondents raise a facial constitutional challenge to §
954(d)(1), and consequently they confront 'a heavy burden' in advancing their claim."
(quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173. 183 (1991)).
67 See Finley IT, 524 U.S. at 580 ('To prevail, respondents must demonstrate a
substantial risk that application of the provision will lead to the suppression of
speech." (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
See Finley JII, 524 U.S. at 587 ('Unless § 954(d)(1) is applied in a manner that
raises concern about the suppression of disfavored viewpoints, however, we uphold
the constitutionality of the provision.-).
69 See id. at 588 ("Congress may 'selectively fund a program to encourage certain
activities it believes to be in the public interest. without at the same time funding an
alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.- (quoting
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noted that "the Government may allocate competitive funding
according to criteria that would be impermissible were direct
regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at stake."70 Con-
gress may "'selectively fund a program to encourage certain
activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the
same time funding an alternative program which seeks to
deal with the problem in another way.'" 7  There is no view-
point discrimination where Congress chooses to fund one ac-
tivity to the exclusion of another. By minimizing the view-
point and vagueness attacks and deferring to Congress'
power of the purse, the Court emasculated the artists' claims,
predetermining section 954(d)(1)'s validity.
B. Scalia's Concurrence: A Hard Look At Practical Realities
1. Practical Repercussions: The Majority Opinion
"[S]ustains ... [the Statute] [Bly [Glutting [Ilt." 2
While the majority opinion dismisses the argument that
section 954(d)(1) created viewpoint discrimination, Justice
Scalia, possessed of common-sense and a cynic's real world
outlook, admitted that the "decency" provision imposes a de
facto condition upon NEA grant awards, regardless of the
technical import of the "taking into consideration" language.
Grammatical parsinge3 and bipartisan politics aside , the
clear intent of the decency language is that indecent art not
receive federal grant money.7 The statute does establish
Rust, 500 U.S. at 193)).
70 Finley III, 524 U.S. at 587-88.
7 Id. at 588 (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 193).
72 Finley ILI, 524 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., concurring).
73 See id. at 591.
The phrase "taking into consideration general standards of decency and re-
spect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public" Is what my
grammar-school teacher would have condemned as a dangling modifier: There
is no noun to which the participle is attached... [E]ven so, It Is clear enough
that the phrase is meant to apply to those who do the judging... when evalu-
ating artistic excellence and merit.
Id.
74 Justice Scalia questioned (mocked) the majority's investigation into the motives
of Congress, which are traditionally considered to be irrelevant in constitutional lines
of inquiry. See Id. at 595.
It matters not whether this enactment was the product of the most partisan
alignment in history or whether, upon Its passage, the Members all linked
arms and sang, "The more we get together, the happier well be." It Is "not
consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into the mo-
tives of legislators."
Id. (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951)).
7 See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 592.
To the extent a particular applicant exhibits disrespect for the diverse beliefs
and values of the American public or fails to comport with general standards of
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content and viewpoint-based criteria, but they are "perfectly
constitutional." 6 The statute makes it clear that decency and
respect are factors to be taken into consideration when de-
ciding whether to award a grant to an artisL These factors
need not be dispositive, but they must be considered." While
the majority was able to give a legally viable reading to the
decency clause, which focused on considerations, Justice
Scalia argued that this reading was hollow and divorced from
the practical realities of the situation.
2. Censorship By Viewpoint Discrination
The First Amendment prohibits abridging the freedom of
speech.79 According to Justice Scalia, nothing in the decency
clause prevents avant-garde artists from being as indecent
and unwholesome as they like. Such artists are perfectly free
to be offensive; they simply cannot expect the government to
pay for their efforts.8 For Justice Scalla, failing to reward a
particular behavior was not necessarily equivalent to pun-
ishing it."' Denying money to indecent art does not carry with
decency, the likelihood that he wilt recelve a grant diminishes....
The applicant who displays "decency," that is, "[clonformlty to prevailing stan-
dards of propriety or modesty," and the applicant who displays "respect." that
is, "deferential regard," for the diverse beliefs and values of the American peo-
ple, will always have an edge over an applicant who displays the opposite.
Id. at 592-93 (first emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Scalia also considered the political context in which section 954(d)(1) was
adopted, but only in so far as the amendment was a direct reaction to public outcry
over NEA funding of Serrano's Plss Christ and Mapplethorpe's The Perfect Moment
See id. at 594. Given the factors that lead to the adoption of section 954(d)(1) in the
first place, it would strain credulity to think that Congress did not intend for the de-
cency clause to limit funding that might otherwise be available to such controversial
works. Clearly, section 954(d)(1) was intended to make funding indecent art more
difficult than funding decent art, Le. It was meant to discriminate. See (ci
76 I& at 590.
7 It is also worth noting that Scalia did not follow the mutual-exclusivity reason-
ing of the majority where vagueness necessarily defeats the view-point discrimination
challenge:
11he conclusion of viewpoint discrimination is not affected by the fact that
what constitutes "decency" or -the diverse beliefs and values of the American
people" is difficult to pin down... any more than a civil-service preference In
favor of those who display "Republican-party values" would be rendered non-
discriminatory by the fact that there is plenty of room for argument as to what
Republican-party values might be.
Id. at 593 (citation omitted).
78 See id. at 595 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia considers the literal
meaning of "abridge" as defined in T. Sheridan's Complete Dictionary of the English
language: "to contract, to diminish, to deprive of." Id.
See U.S. ConsL amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the free-
dom of speech .... ").
80 See Finley 111, 524 U.S. at 595-96.
81 See zd.
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it the danger of suppression of certain ideas or a coercive ef-
fect.82
3. The Nature of the Beast:
Award Programs Are Discriminatory
Scalia pointed out that because the NEA simply cannot
award money to every artist who wants funding, it must re-
ward some applicants and reject others. Deciding how to
divide a sum certain among a virtually infinite number of ap-
plicants mandates some sort of ranking system; that is the
nature of funding organizations.' As Scalia pithily noted, "[ilt
is the very business of government to favor and disfavor some
points of view."85 For Justice Scalia, the existence of a Na-
tional Endowment for the Arts, which has a non-infinite
budget, predestines some amount of viewpoint discrimina-
tion. Any criterion will be discriminatory to some extent.8
See id. at 596.
Censorship, as I understand it, is the attempt- almost always unjustified- to
use the power of the state to silence expression- for example, by jailing artists
or burning books, practices that we associate with totalitarian societies. But a
withdrawal of public financial support (tax dollars) strikes me as quite a differ-
ent thing- objectionable perhaps, but not in the same league with most cases
of genuine censorship.... Even if people have a right to desecrate the flag, it
does not follow that they have a right that somebody else be forced to pay the
bill to provide them with an arena in which to do it. To suggest otherwise is, I
think, logically confused and morally dangerous- morally dangerous because
it cheapens the currency of moral discourse when a strong condemnatory word
such as 'censorship' is used casually.
Id. (quoting Jeffrie G. Murphy, Freedom of Expression and the Arts, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
549, 550 (1997)).
See Finley 11, 524 U.S. at 596 (arguing that a denial of funding to certain points
of view is not coercive).
8 See id.
Id. at 598. Justice Scalia went even further to suggest that "the NEA itself Is
nothing less than an institutionalized discrimination against [certain] point[s] of
view." Id. at 597.
While never explicitly discussed by the Court or Justice Scalia, It is important
to realize that "decency" discriminates against subject matter that conflicts with de-
cent expression. For example, unlike Republicanism, or atheism, or vegetarianism,
which ostensibly embrace identifiable world outlooks, decency is an umbrella term
encompassing a mode of expression. Theoretically, it is possible to express anything
decently or indecently. Consider the following: "Republicanism" in and of itself, Is
arguably not indecent. However, were one to create a work of art depicting famous,
political conservatives in a crass or lewd manner, that expression could be indecent.
As a mode of expression, decency will discriminate against those viewpoints which
are strongly correlated with and customarily expressed in an indecent way. A corre-
lation between certain ideas and indecent expression is an unspoken assumption In
the decency-discrimination debate.
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C. Souter's Dissent
1. Viewpoint Dlscrimination
Essentially, Souter's dissent was predicated on two simple
conclusions: the decency clause mandates viewpoint dis-
crimination and the First Amendment declares viewpoint dis-
crimination in the exercise of public authority over expression
to be unconstitutional. Souter argued that because the
First Amendment has been interpreted to require viewpoint
neutrality, the government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea nor discriminate in granting "government favors " 9
simply because society finds that idea offensive or oppressive.
Therefore, he continued, Congress cannot prohibit protected
speech based on whether or not it is offensive.
The dissent claimed that First Amendment jurisprudence
shows that Congress is not allowed to use decency as a stan-
dard for regulating speech.9' Souter argued that "indecency"
is an inherently viewpoint-based criterion.' The idea of inde-
cency is inseparable from the ideas and expression conveyed
by the art; thus, by regulating the decency requirement, Con-
gress regulates expression. While Souter conceded that the
government's purpose is not the controlling consideration in a
First Amendment case, he noted the gurpose here was clearly
to withhold money from offensive art.
See Finley, 524 U.S. at 600-01, noting that:
The decency and respect proviso mandates viewpoint-based decisions in the
disbursement of government subsidies, and the Government has wholly failed
to explain why the statute should be afforded an exemption from the funda-
mental rule of the First Amendment that viewpoint discrimination in the exer-
cise of public authority over expressive activity is unconstitutional.
88 See fi at 601 ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment.
it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an Idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." (citing Texas v. Johnson. 491
U.S. 397. 414 (1989))).
89Id.
90 See f&. ("Congress is generally not permitted to pivot discrimination against oth-
erwise protected speech on the offensiveness or unacceptability of the views It ex-
presses.").
91 See f&. at 615 n.9 (noting that the government may use neutral criteria such as
artistic merit in awarding grants. but not viewpoint-based criteria (citing Rosenber-
gerv. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.. 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995))).
92 See f&L
93 Like Justice Scalia, Justice Souter recognizes that section 954(d)(1) was clearly
intended by its drafters and proponents to have a discriminatory effect on the fund-
ing of indecent art. See f&. at 608. It was not meant to be a consideration, but
rather a criterion. See fi. While Justice Scalla dismisses the discriminatory effect in
the face of a constitutional condition on a congressional grant, see &. at 595-96.
Justice Souter condemns the decency clause as an impermissible attempt by the
federal government to suppress unpopular ideas, which cannot be accomplished
even where Congress is signing the check and paying for the arL See fd. at 604 n.2.
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2. Government Patronage and Conditioned Spending
Justice Souter believed that even though the government
had voluntarily entered a realm not recognized as one of its
traditional responsibilities, having thus assumed the task, it
was bound to fund the activity in a non-discriminatory man-
ner.' Souter echoed recent case law when he stated, "'this is
not to suggest that funding by the Government, even when
coupled with the freedom of the fund recipients to speak out-
side the scope of the Government-funded project, is invaria-
bly sufficient to justify Government control over the content
of expression. '"" Congress simply may not discriminate in-
vidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to suppress ideas.
In his dissent, Justice Souter discussed the hypocrisy or
willful blindness of the Court's technical interpretation of
section 954(d)(1) as a consideration, indicating that the Court
would have no trouble concluding that other "considerations"
would clearly be constitutionally suspect:
But even if I found the Court's view of "consideration" plausible,
that would make no difference at all on the question of constitu-
tionality. What if the statute required a panel to apply criteria
"taking into consideration the centrality of Christianity to the
American cultural experience," or "taking into consideration
whether the artist is a communist," or "taking into consideration
the political message conveyed by the art," or even "taking into
consideration the superiority of the white race?" Would the
Court hold these considerations facially constitutional, merely
because the statute had no requirement to give them any par-
ticular, much less controlling, weight? I assume not.9
3. The Implicit Danger of Indirect Censorship
In addition to the immediate cash value of an NEA grant,
Justice Souter reminded the Court that the grant also acts as
a "stamp of approval"97 for works of art. Following receipt of
an NEA grant, an artist can often expect to receive additional
funds from private sources who respect the NEA award
enough to follow suit.9 When Congress enacted the decency
See id. at 604 n.2 (noting that the First Amendment "speaks up only when Con-
gress decides to participate in the Nation's artistic life by legal regulation, as it does
through a subsidy scheme like the NEA ... [such that i f Congress does choose to
spend public funds in this manner, it may not discriminate by viewpoint in deciding
who gets the money").
95 Id. at 612 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199 (1991)).
Finley L, 524 U.S. at 610.
97 Walker, supra note 19, at 941.
98 See Finley HI, 524 U.S. at 622 (citing Bella Lewltzky Dance Found. v.
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clause, it in effect stifled much of the support for indecent art
with the intent andprobable result being the eventual demise
of such expression.
Like Justice Scalia, Justice Souter was willing and eager
to state the arguably obvious repercussions of throwing hur-
dles in front of those who would seek funding for their inde-
cent artistic sensibilities; namely, less money for indecent art,
and thereby, less indecent art. One could argue that the
chief differences between the reasoning of the majority and
the dissent lay in the philosophical disagreement over any
duty of impartiality Congress had once it has directly under-
taken an activity for promoting cultural consciousness.
When one approaches the situation believing that Congress
can condition its grants, the decency criterion is simply a
unique brand of qualification which attaches to artistic rather
than academic excellence and merit. On the other hand,
where one approaches the situation from a strict free-speech
perspective, the decency clause is seen as a tool for invidi-
ously discriminating against a particular point of view and its
expression; arguably, using legislation to quash art which
some senators and representatives find distasteful moves
dangerously close to censorship.
To further appreciate the tensions inherent in Finley, one
must examine it in light of two prior cases, Rust and Rosen-
berger, chiefly cited by the majority and dissent respectively.
Taken together with the analysis in Finley, the three cases
illustrate the thorny conundrum that one encounters when
trying to parse out the "correct" or "just" response to a con-
stitutional attack on the decency clause. Additionally, by ex-
amining the issues and inconsistencies raised by comparing
these cases, one cannot help but conclude that the realm of
artistic expression is a domain best left to private funding
sources, who need only please their own subjective tastes and
sensibilities when writing a donation check. The government
simply cannot formulate a principled system of rewarding ar-
tistic works, because any standard will (1) be inherently sub-
jective; (2) offend some section of the tax-paying populace; (3)
discriminate against some works of art; and (4) reasonably be
interpreted as either constitutional or unconstitutional, de-
Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774. 783 (S.D. Cal. 1991)).
Despite Justice Souter's discussion of the possible implications that the De-
cency Clause will have in private support for arts funding. these effects, while un-
fortunate, do not necessarily change the underlying theory that the First Amendment
does not entitle one to have the government pay the bill for ones freedom of speech.
See Murphy, supra note 82. at 560 (We all have a constitutional right that the state
respect for each of us a wide range of expressive freedom but no comparable right
that the state pay the bill for this freedom.).
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pending on whether one approaches the problem with either
Congress's tax and spend power or the First Amendment in
mind.
Although the mere controversial nature of, or philosophi-
cal difficulty in, creating a principled answer to a challenging
question is an insufficient reason to say that Congress should
ignore or run from an issue, the costs of angling over issues
of public arts funding can be divisive and time-consuming,
and may indicate that it is simply time for Congress and the
nation to move on to more pressing concerns. Recently, the
NEA has found itself mired in expensive litigation over emo-
tionally charged issues. If artists cannot accept that Con-
gress may constitutionally condition the granting of NEA
funds, then, it may be best for both artists and legislators to
move in their separate directions.
III. fINLE;YIN LIGHT OF RUSTAND ROSENBERGER
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech." °° While this handful of words ostensibly imparts a
simple idea to the reader, Supreme Court jurisprudence on
the First Amendment clearly indicates that the right to "free
speech" is not absolute.101  Defamatory attacks, ° fighting
words,' °3 and obscene expression"°4 are the chief examples of
types of speech that the government is able to regulate to
some degree. Art' is recognized as a form of speech worthy
100 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
101 See e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that de-
famatory speech is not unconditionally protected by the Constitution); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding that fighting words are not constitu-
tionally protected.).
102 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80 ("The constitutional guarantees require... a
federal rule that prohibiting a public official from recovering damages for defamatory
falsehood... unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual mal-
ice'. ..").
103 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (holding that words designed to incite Immedi-
ate unlawful behavior are not protected speech under the First Amendment).
104 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (establishing the three criteria
for determining whether speech Is obscene and beyond the protection of the First
Amendment).
105 Arguably the definition of "art" Itself Is a vagary. Some propose that experts
should determine what is art. See Beverly M. Wolff, A Look at the NEA Restrictive
Language and Whether Art by Definition Can be Obscene, address before The Samual
Rubin Program for Liberty and Equality Through the Law: Arts Funding and Censor-
ship - The Helms Amendment and Beyond, (Mar. 8, 1990). in 15 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARrS 23, 24, 28 (1990) ("[C]urators are empowered by us to make those determina-
tions of what is art. A court would.., be hard pressed to overrule a curatorial
judgment."); but see Richard Epstein, Constitutional Conundrums in the Public Fund-
ing of the Arts, Address before the Samuel Rubin Program for Liberty and Equality
Through the Law: Arts Funding and Censorship - The Helms Amendment and Beyond
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of First Amendment protection; °5 however, it is not always
recognized as a form of political speech' and as a result does
not always automatically enjoy the highest level of protec-
tion.1°s For this reason, artistic expression, when challenged,
must seek protection through First Amendment jurispruden-
tial doctrines such as overbreadth.'09 As the majority opinion
in Finley illustrates, this level of protection is not fail-safe."
1
A. Decency Clause Violates First Amendment
as Vague and Viewpoint-Discriminatory
Unlike "obscenity," the definition of which has been de-
lineated by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Califomia,"' the
(Mar. 8, 1990). in 15 COLUM.-VIAJ.L. &ARTS 23. 30. 37 (1990) (7I would much pre-
fer systematically to take precious public resources and devote them to those issues
that indisputably require a collective choice rather than frittering them away on what
I regard to be essentially a second order problem: Is X a really great artist or just a
fool who managed to graduate with an MFA?).
Additionally, at least one author has argued that the mere fact that art Is cre-
ated by a marginalized artist who typifies a minority political view Is insufficient to
catapult his or her expression into the realm of art. See Jeffrlie G. Murphy. supra
note 82, at 554 declaring that:
Mere victim status-- status as a person marginalized... on grounds of gen-
der, sexual orientation, mental illness, political alienation or whatever- can-
not automatically qualify one's cries of pain and outrage as artistically signifi-
cant expressions- not, at any rate, on any theory of art that would take art
seriously.
'o6 See, e.g.. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston
Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (noting that examples of painting, music, and poetry
are "unquestionably shielded); Ward v. Rock Against Racism. 491 U.S. 781. 790
(1989) ("Music, as a form of expression and communication. Is protected under the
First Amendment."); Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61. 65 (1981) (Entertain-
ment, as well as political and ideological speech. is protected: motion pictures, pro-
grams broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical
and dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee."): Kaplan v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973) (7[P]Ictures, films, paintings. drawings. and en-
gravings ... have First Amendment protection .... ). But see Robert H. Bork. Neu-
tral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems. 47 IND. L.J. 1. 27-29 (1971)
(arguing that art is not political speech and is therefore not worthy of First Amend-
ment protection).
107 See, e.g., Harry Kalven. Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity. 1960 SuP.
Cr. REv. 1, 16 ("The people do not need novels or dramas or paintings or poems be-
cause they will be called upon to vote. Art and belles-lettres do not deal in such
ideas (i.e. ideas relevant to the political process)- at least not good art or good
belles-lettres. . . .") (parenthetical added).
108 See generally. Young v. American Mini Theatres Inc., 427 U.S. 50. 70 (1976)
(Stevens, J.) (arguing that even though erotic materials may have some artistic value.
society's First Amendment interest in them is wholly different from and less than Its
interest in untrammeled political debate).
109 See Finley /H. 524 U.S. at 583 (noting the overbreadth argument).
"0 See id. at 583 (rejecting the overbreadth argument).
I See Miller v. California. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (outlining the three guidelines
used to establish obscenity).
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concept of decency is inherently subjective." 2  When inter-
preting "decency clauses" in various First Amendment con-
texts, the Court is often relegated to use of a standard Eng-
lish dictionary in the quest for an interpretation of the statute
at issue."3 Decency by definition is a function of community
values, and these values will vary demographically. Decency,
then, is inherently vague in that it cannot ostensibly be de-
fined on a national level." 4 Ironically, it is decency's vague-
ness which argues most strongly against the viewpoint dis-
crimination challenge."5
In cases where the Supreme Court has found statutes to
discriminate impermissibly on the basis of viewpoint, the
statute has, with relative clarity, put a particular ideology at a
distinct disadvantage." 6 For example, the Court has struck
down statutes and ordinances where the "Christian" view-
point was disadvantaged in expressing itself on a topic, while
the "atheist" viewpoint was not similarly muzzled. 7  While
the government may be able to justify context discrimination
12 One could justifiably argue that the concept of "obscenity" was equally subjec-
tive, until such time as the Supreme Court saw fit to define it. However, the Court
has had repeated opportunities to elucidate the legal community on the meaning of
or criteria for "decency." Each time, regardless of whether the statute was ultimately
invalidated or not (including the present case) the Court has declined the invitation.
See generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (holding that the Communi-
cations Decency Act is violative of First Amendment); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 749-51 (1978) (affirming the FCC's power under 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) to
a write comment letter to a radio station to the effect that a George Carlin mono-
logue, "Filthy Words," was indecent and should not have been aired when children
were in the audience).
13 See Finley I, 524 U.S. at 593 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting The American
Heritage Dictionary's definition of "decency").
114 But see Helms, supra note 14, at 99 (defining what he considers to be national
decency, i.e. Judeo-Christian morality).
115 See Finley /1, 524 U.S. at 583. The irony is especially sharp since the majority
in Finley H/ used respondents' own argument against them:
As respondents' own arguments demonstrate, the considerations that the pro-
vision introduces, by their nature, do not engender the kind of directed view-
point discrimination that would prompt this Court to invalidate a statute on Its
face. Respondents assert, for example, that "one would be hard-pressed to
find two people in the United States who could agree on what the 'diverse be-liefs and values of the American public' are, much less on whether a particular
work of art 'respects' them"; and they claim that "'decency' is likely to mean
something very different to a septuagenarian in Tuscaloosa and a teenager in
Las Vegas .... " Accordingly, the provision does not introduce considerations
that, in practice, would effectively preclude or punish the expression of par-
ticular views.
Id.
116 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 393-94 (1993) (holding that a school district violated the First Amendment
when it denied church access to school premises after school solely because church
wanted to address a subject from religious viewpoint).
117 See id. at 392-97 (asserting that denying church access to school premises vio-
lates the First Amendment).
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on rare occasions where the prohibition is narrowly tailored
to a valid government goal or interest, the Court generally
finds viewpoint discrimination to embody the blatant sup-
pression of one (disfavored) group's ideas. '
If "decency" is inherently vague or, if definable, conceivably
disadvantages one group's ideas or preferred medium of ex-
pressing those ideas, what saves it from unconstitutionality?
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion first sought solace in a
cramped, technical interpretation of the statutory language,
in that decency need only be "take[n] into consideration,"
rather than used as an absolute criterion."9  Prior caselaw,
especially the Supreme Court's holding in Rosenberger, weak-
ens O'Connor's reasoning. Generally, the Court has been ag-
gressive to the point of being categorical when protecting
speech from conditions on its use. ' 20 With relatively few ex-
ceptions,"1 regulations and conditions which hint at the gov-
ermment's attempt to suppress unpopular or unpleasant
thoughts and ideas are invalidated with little apology or ex-
planation.1 2
Scalia's concurrence and Souter's dissent recognize the
common-sense implications of the decency clause: it is a re-
striction on the funding of "indecent" art. Since prior caselaw
strongly indicates, if not dictates, that the decency clause
embodies content if not invidious viewpoint discrimination,
upholding section 954(d)(1) primarily reflects the Court's be-
liefs about the government's spending powers, rather than
any philosophical ideas about art and expression. At its
foundation, Finley affirms Rust and gives Congress great dis-
cretion in spending tax revenue, even to the point of "regu-
lating" what many recognize as a valuable expression of and a
commentary on society's values: the voice of the artist.
18 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.. 515 U.S. 819. 834
(1995) (providing analysis for the determination that a school's regulation prohibiting
the distribution of funds to a religious newspaper violated the First Amendment).
19 FInley 111, 524 U.S. at 582 (The statute 'admonishes the NEA merely to take 'de-
cency and respect' into consideration.").
120 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997): Lamb's Chapel. 508 U.S. at
393-94; Police Dep't of the City of Chicago v. Mosley. 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating
a statute that differentiated between types of picketing allowable within 150 feet of a
school).
121 See supra note 99.
122 See, e.g., Cohen v. California. 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that the public dis-
play of expletive words are protected under the First Amendment absent a compel-
ling state interest).
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B. Attaching Strings:
Congress Has the Right to Condition an Award
While the majority opinion simply concludes that if section
954(d)(1) is unconstitutional, so are innumerable government
programs predicated on excellence, Scalia's concurrence ex-
pounded in far greater detail why the government's either
vague or specifically discriminatory condition is constitu-
tional. Essentially, the government can spend tax money as
it sees fit. In fact, the raison d'etre of democratic self-
governance is that some viewpoints (those of the minority)
will suffer slightly at the hands of the majority when the gov-
ernment is deciding how to handle its "largesse." Scalia's
conclusion echoed prior Court holdings in Rust and South
Dakota v. Dole 12 The reasoning is simple and eloquent, but
philosophical problems arise when one considers that Con-
gress has affirmatively entered the artistic speech realm. The
consequences of selectively rewarding decent art may have
more troubling repercussions than limiting federally funded
contraception programs to pre-conception methods, or re-
quiring South Dakota to raise its drinking age to 21. The
above examples of attaching strings to federal money argua-
bly pose little or no danger to freedom of speech and expres-
sion. When Congress chooses, however, to place conditions
on grants to artists, whose job is to hold a mirror to society
through music, sculpture, or painting, those conditions pose
a far greater risk of censorship. This danger is explored fur-
ther below.'2
C. Viewpoint Discrimination and Conditions on a Grant:
Rust & Rosenberger Collide
Governmental attempts to regulate speech by content or
viewpoint are judged with a strict scrutiny standard.125 Gen-
erally, when the Court has been sympathetic to regulations,
statutes, and ordinances that ostensibly limit speech based
on viewpoint or content, the regulations at issue have been
123 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (validating the receipt of government funds for highway
maintenance conditioned on raising the minimum drinking age to 21 under the
spending power of Congress).
2 See infra Part C.
125 See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727. 784-
85 (1996) (Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in part, concurring in judgment,
and dissenting in part) ("[S]trict scrutiny at least confines the balancing process in a
manner protective of speech; it does not disable government from addressing serious
problems, but does ensure that the solutions do not sacrifice speech to a greater ex-
tent than necessary.").
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narrowly tailored and closely related to valid governmental
objectives.126 Those cases which invalidated the legislation or
ordinance at issue have relied on a general premise that the
"government may not prohibit the expression of an idea sim-
ply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagree-
able."127  In such cases where the governmental attempt at
regulating speech is declared unconstitutional, the Court
generally relies on the expressive nature of the speech cou-
pled with the tenet that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our con-
stitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to con-
fess by word or act their faith therein. "'
Despite such strong sweeping sentiment which seduces
the reader with its bright-line simplicity, the Court has been
willing to turn a blind eye to obvious viewpoint discriminatory
regulations where the government is paying for the service or
expression. The most recent application of this approach is
found in Rust v. SuUlvam12 This case involved a facial chal-
lenge to Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS")
regulations which limited the ability of Title X fund recipients
to engage in abortion-related activities."O The regulations at
issue attached three conditions to the grant of federal funds
for Title X projects. First, the regulations specified that a "Ti-
tle X project may not provide counseling concerning the use
of abortion as a method of family planning or provide referral
C26 See generally &L (ruling that provision permitting cable operator to prohibit pat-
ently offensive or indecent programming was consonant with appropriate govern-
ment needs and objectives); see also Rust v. Sullivan. 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (asserting
that regulations forbidding discussion of abortion In programs using Title X funds do
not violate First Amendment right to free speech); Leathers v. Medlock. 499 U.S. 439
(1991) (holding that Arkansas' extension of generally applicable sales tax to cable
television services alone, or to cable and satellite services, while exempting print me-
dia, does not violate First Amendment); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent. 466
U.S. 789 (1984) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting posting signs on public prop-
erty was not unconstitutional as applied to expressive activities of supporters of a
political candidate); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash.. 461 U.S. 540
(1983) (ruling that internal revenue statute which grants tax exemption for certain
nonprofit organizations that do not engage in lobbying activities does not violate First
Amendment); FCC v. Pacifica Found.. 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding that FCC review
which condemned daytime broadcast of indecent George Carlin monologue not vio-
lative of First Amendment where there was reasonable concern that children would
be in the listening audience at the time of the broadcast).
127 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (invalidating Texas statute which
prohibited flag burning).
128 Id. at 415 (citation omitted).
129 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (holding that regulations that prohibit Title X projects from
engaging in activities advocating abortion are a permissible construction of the stat-
ute and consistent with the First and Fifth Amendments).
130 See d. at 177-78.
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for abortion as a method of family planning."3' Second, the
regulations broadly prohibit a Title X project from engaging in
activities that "encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a
method of family planning." 32 Finally, the regulations require
that Title X projects be organized so that they are "physically
and financially separate" from prohibited abortion activities."
By mounting a facial challenge to the constitutionality of
the statute, the petitioners in Rust faced a heavy burden:
establishing that the Act would not be valid under any set of
circumstances.' Since all discussion of abortion was essen-
tially banned, petitioners contended that the regulations vio-
lated the First Amendment by impermissibly discriminating
based on viewpoint." The Court rejected this challenge
holding that:
[tihe Government can, without violating the Constitution, selec-
tively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to
be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an
alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in an-
other way. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated
on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one ac-
tivity to the exclusion of the other.3
Similar logic echoes in the majority's holding in Finley,
where the Court upheld the government's prerogative in se-
lectively funding species of artistic expression. 37 The Court's
reasoning in Rust also relied heavily on distinguishing be-
tween statutes which regulated through rewards as opposed
to penalties. '8 While the Court in Rust began its analysis
131 Id. at 179 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1)(1989)).
132 Id. at 180 (citing 42 C.F.R § 59. 10(a)(1989)).
13 Id. at 180 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1989)).
1 See id. at 183 ("[The challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which the Act would be valid.").
13 See Id. at 192. Petitioners argued that the First Amendment was violated be-
cause they prohibited "counseling, referral, and the provision of neutral and accurate
information about ending a pregnancy." Id. (citation omitted).
'3 Id. at 193.
137 See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998).
138 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 317 n. 19 (1980)). "A refusal to fund protected activity, without more, cannot be
equated with the imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity." Id. In general, the Court
has been especially eager to invalidate statutes which penalize on the basis of view-
point. See e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992) (citation omitted),
which invalidated a St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime ordinance which made
plac[ing] on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, charac-
terization or graffiti, including, but not limited to... a burning cross...
,which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender
commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
See also Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992) (reversing sentence in criminal
case where jury had based sentencing decision on prisoner's membership in a racist
gang); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (invalidating the Flag Protec-
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claiming that the government had not in fact discriminated
on the basis of viewpoint, it later equivocated, explaining that
"[tlo hold that the Government unconstitutionally discrimi-
nates on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a
program dedicated to advance certain permissible goals, be-
cause the program in advancing those goals necessarily dis-
courages alternative goals, would render numerous Govern-
ment programs constitutionally suspect."'9 While the Court
first seems to deny that the Government's conditions in Title
X even constitute viewpoint discrimination, the latter passage
seems to hint that the Court might have believed that the
conditions did (at least in application) constitute some form of
viewpoint discrimination; however, the Court recognized that
invalidating the conditions on Title X would potentially en-
danger all Government programs which rewarded some
qualities to the exclusion of others. Justice O'Connor's ma-
jority opinion in Finley is strongly reminiscent of this line of
policy reasoning, validating section 954(d)(1) in part out of
concern for the potential ripple effect on other Congressional
award/grant programs.'
Like the provisions at issue in Rust, the decency clause
found in section 954(d)(1) serves as both a limitation on the
breadth and scope of the use of federal funds, and a selective
rewarding to certain viewpoints. In Rust "pro-choice" was a
viewpoint which could not be sounded lest federal funds be
lost; similarly, in Finley, that "viewpoint" which correlates
significantly with indecency in a mode of artistic expression
was put at a distinct disadvantage in the competition for fed-
eral funds, despite the "opaque" drafting of the statute. While
aspects of Rust support both O'Connor's"4' and Scalia's
tion Act of 1989 which made flag burning a federal crime): Texas v. Johnson. 491
U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating Texas statute which criminalized flag burning): Police
Dept of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidated city ordinance which dis-
tinguished between non-labor and labor picketing, criminalizing the former and al-
lowing the latter); Cohen v. California. 403 U.S. 15. 18 (1971) (invalidating statute
where "[t]he only 'conduct: which the State sought to punish is the fact of communi-
cation7 where accused was convicted under the statute for wearing jacket with 'Fuck
the Draft7 written on it).
13 Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.
140 See Finley II1, 524 U.S. at 589 ("Indeed. If this statute is unconstitutionally
vague, then so too are all Government programs awarding scholarships and grants
on the basis of subjective criteria such as 'excellence.-).
141 In O'Connor's opinion, the ambiguous drafting of section 954(d)(1) is neither
viewpoint-discriminatory, nor poses any danger of viewpoint discrimination. See td.
at 588-90.
142 Unlike Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia recognizes that section 954(d](1) was
intended to be, and most likely would be in practice, a criterion for receiving NEA
funds and would put indecently expressed art at a distinct disadvantage (if not act
as an absolute bar). See generally Walker, supra note 19.
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opinions in Finley regarding the fmer distinctions on view-
point discrimination, the sentiments in Rust clearly indicate
that Congress enjoys wider latitude in regulating speech
(through actions and behaviors) when Congress is not only
listening, but paying as well.' 3  Had Finley arisen in 1990,
given the non-criminal nature of the effect of failing to comply
with section 954(d)(1) and the fact that Congress was under-
writing the National Endowment for the Arts, the holding
would have been most unspectacular. The Court's 1995 de-
cision in Rosenberger, however, added more tension to an al-
ready murky First Amendment jurisprudence.
D. Rosenberger: Scarce Resources
and Viewpoint Discrimination
In the early 1990s, a student organization, Wide Awake
Productions ("Wide Awake"), sued the University of Virginia
for failing to use money from the Student Activity Fund
("SAF")"4 to pay for the costs of the organization's Christian
publication.' 5 The SAF received its money from a mandatory
fee of $14 per semester charged to each full-time student. "
When Wide Awake petitioned the SAF to pay for the printing
costs of its publication, the SAF refused, claiming that Wide
Awake was a religious organization. 4 After appeals within
143 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
144 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 824-27
(1995):
Established and governed by University Guidelines, the purpose of the SAF is
to support a broad range of extracurricular student activities that "are related
to the educational purpose of the University...." The Student Council,
elected by the students, has the initial authority to disburse the funds, but its
actions are subject to review by a faculty body chaired by a designee of the
Vice President for Student Affairs. Some, but not all, [student groups]... may
submit disbursement requests to the SAF. The Guidelines recognize 11 cate-
gories of student groups that may seek payment... because they "are related
to the educational purpose of the University of Virginia." One of these Is "stu-
dent news, information, opinion, entertainment or academic communications
media groups ...." [Situdent activities that are excluded from SAF support
are religious activities.... A "religious activity".., is defined as any activity
that "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[fl in or about a deity or
an ultimate reality."
Id. (alteration in original and citations omitted). Wide Awake was created to publish
a magazine for philosophical and religious expression, with tolerance to Christian
viewoints. Id. at 825-26.
See icL at 822-23 (citation omitted):
The University of Virginia... authorizes the payment of outside contractors
for the printing costs of a variety of student publications. It withheld any
authorization for payments on behalf of petitioners for the sole reason that
their student paper "primarily promotes... a particular belielf]... in... a
deity."
146 See eL at 824.
147 See id. at 827. SAF claimed that the newspaper manifested a particular belief
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the university failed, Wide Awake filed suit in federal court,
claiming that the refusal to grant funds constituted imper-
missible viewpoint discrimination.
8
Ruling that the University of Virginia's refusal to fund
Wide Awake Productions violated the First Amendment pro-
hibition on viewpoint discrimination,4 9 the Supreme Court
asserted the basic First Amendment axiom that "the govern-
ment may not regulate speech based on its substantive con-
tent or the message it conveys."'" The principle that follows
is that "[fin the realm of private speech or expression, gov-
ernment regulation may not favor one speaker over an-
other."' 5 The Court explained that the University of Virginia's
refusal had the effect of closing academic debate on religious
topics, since atheists were free to voice their opinions, while
the Christian viewpoint, as published by Wide Awake, would
have been muzzled to the extent of its ability to pay its own
printing costs without SAF aid.'2 That risk is analogous to
the risk Justice Souter voiced in his dissent in Finley: under
the amendment, indecent art would be financially disadvan-
taged when compared to decent art (at least for National En-
dowment dollars), while views expressed "decently" would
have no such handicap.1 3
about a deity or ultimate reality. See icL
148 See icL (noting that Wide Awake alleged that SAF's refusal to provide funds
based on religious editorial viewpoint violated their rights to freedom of speech).
149 See id. at 837 ('[We hold that the regulation invoked to deny SAF support. both
in its terms and in its application... is a denial of their right of free speech guaran-
teed by the First Amendment.); see also eL at 828:
By the very terms of the SAF prohibition, the University does not exclude re-
ligion as a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those student
journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints. Religion may be a vast
area of inquiry, but it also provides, as it did here, a specific premise. a per-
spective, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and
considered. The prohibited perspective, not the general subject matter, re-
sulted in the refusal to make third-party payments, for the subjects discussed
were otherwise within the approved category of publications.
Id. (emphasis added).
150 1& at 828 (citing Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92. 96 (1972)).
151 Id. (citing City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent. 466 U.S. 789. 804 (1984)).
152 See id. at 836 ("For the University, by regulation, to cast disapproval on par-
ticular viewpoints of its students risks the suppression of free speech and creative
inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation's intellectual life, its college and uni-
versity campuses."). While the majority opinion chiefly relies on the fact that the
University policy discriminates based on viewpoints, see supra note 149. Justice
Kennedy acknowledges that one could interpret the University guideline's -sweeping
restrictions on student thought" as a blanket censorship mechanism, which, when
carried to its logical extreme, could be read to prohibit all speech with a religious
content, whether spoken by an atheist or the devoutly religious. Such content-based
discrimination would be equally repugnant to First Amendment values. See d. at
836-37.
153 See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569. 621-22 (1998)
(explaining that the makers of controversial art will either "trim their work" of offen-
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Initially, one may be tempted to distinguish Rosenberger
from Rust by suggesting that, where all projects cannot be
funded, the government enjoys far greater discretion in its
ability to discriminate in spending its tax dollars. The Court's
sweeping language in Rosenberger, however, weakens the va-
lidity of this distinction; "[tihe government cannot justify
viewpoint discrimination among private speakers on the eco-
nomic fact of scarcity.... It would have been incumbent on
the State, of course, to ration or allocate the scarce resources
on some acceptable neutral principle."" 4  Suddenly,
O'Connor's reasoning in Finley, which rested at least partially
on the fact that the NEA has a finite budget, loses force. It
would appear that the fact that the NEA lacks the resources
to allocate funds to every applicant for funds, does not allow
the budgeting criteria to be unfair or prejudiced against an
unpopular viewpoint.
In its own discussion of Rust, the Rosenberger Court ex-
plained that the government:
did not create a program to encourage private speech but instead
used private speakers to transmit specific information pertaining
to its own program. We recognized that when the government
appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its
own it is entitled to say what it wishes.... When the govern-
ment disburses public ftnds to private entities to convey a gov-
ernmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps
to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the
grantee. 155
Thus it appears that to save the decency clause from un-
constitutionality, one must only find that the government is
taking legitimate steps to ensure that its message is not gar-
bled. Here, analogizing to Rust, the message is the desirabil-
ity of "decent" art. If the government can constitutionally
determine that decency may be a consideration in the public
funding of art, and that notion creates a visceral emotional
reprobation in the American public, the NEA may cause more
strife than good. Perhaps the majority's holding in Finley
signals that it is time for the government to try to find an-
other means of supporting the arts.
sive content or refrain from seeking NEA funding altogether).
154 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835.
155 Id. at 833 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194, 196-200 (1990) (citations
omitted)).
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E. The Nature ofArts Funding
and Role of the Government:
The Patron/Sovereign Distinction
One final distinction relied upon by the Court in Finley is
the patron/sovereign dichotomy. This approach is the very
semantic incarnation of the two ways of viewing the decency
clause (taxation and spending versus freedom of expression)
which are essentially outcome determinative frameworks for
viewing the entire issue.
Unlike the University of Virginia in Rosenberger, Congress
is not seeking to reimburse individuals for the cost of expres-
sion. Whereas in Rosenberger, the University was paying
printing costs directly to third-party contractors who had
printed Wide Awake's news publication,"s Congress (through
the NEA) is not reimbursing individual artists. Congress has
used tax dollars to create and support a National Endowment
for the Arts. Like the program created by Title X, 7 the NEA
is an entity that owes its existence to Congressional enabling
legislation."5 Congress has the ability to use private speakers
(e.g. artists) to promote a particular policy of its own.'o
As in Rust when it discriminated against abortion, Con-
gress in Finley had the ability, having brought the NEA into
being and possessing the power to annihilate it as well, to
selectively fund some types of art to the exclusion of others.
That the art community does not approve of Congress's taste
in art is a function of happenstance. Had a more liberal Con-
gress decided that indecent art was more worthy of funding,
Finley might never have darkened the doorstep of a court-
house. As Justice Scalia aptly pointed out, the nature of gov-
ernment is to make choices to implement the will of the ma-
jority,1" even where that majority- speaking through its
elected representatives- chooses to support some viewpoints
156 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 850 (O'Connor. J.. concurring) ('[Fjunds are paid
directly to the third party vendor and do not pass through the organization's cof-
fers.").
157 See Rust 500 U.S. at 178-79 (describing Title X which provides federal funding
for family planning services).
158 There is no constitutional duty to provide for the arts. Congress voluntarily
entered the art world in 1965 by creating the NEA by legislation. See Left. supra
note 12, at 363-64.
159 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-96. "The Government can, without violating the
Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities It believes to
be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program
which seeks to deal with the problem in another way." Id at 193.
160 See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley. 524 U.S. 569. 598 (1998)
(Scalia, J.. concurring) (arguing that congressional funding of expressive activities
advances "[the people's] favored point of view").
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but not others. While the First Amendment can easily protect
those whose rights are threatened by regulation through
criminal penalties, its driving force is weakened in the face of
"regulation" through congressional funding. Artists who re-
ceive NEA grants are chosen by the specific criteria pertaining
to the program.'"' In seeking the funding, artists recognize
and accept a limited amount of self-censorship. Aware of the
criteria for receiving funding, artists who seek and realisti-
cally expect to receive such grants are not so naive that they
do not realize the costs. Those artists who prefer to remain
indecent in their subject matter or expression need only find
a private patron with similar artistic predilections.
Congress is not required by the First Amendment to sub-
sidize a citizen's fundamental right to free expression. 2
Having chosen to enter the realm of arts funding, has Con-
gress changed the balance of power to such a degree that the
arts now depend upon the NEA? Presumably not, given the
NEA's relatively brief history and limited budget.' Artists
angered by the conditions and considerations Congress has
attached to the NEA grant process may choose among several
remedies. They may use the legislative process to elect a
Congress more likely to replace the decency provision in sec-
tion 954(d)(1) with an indecency provision, which, according
to the reasoning in Rust and Finley, would be just as consti-
tutional. Conversely, they may compromise their artistic
voice in the struggle for limited NEA dollars, that is, they may
prostitute themselves; or, they may retain the integrity of
their mode and medium, seeking patronage from private
sponsors.
161 See Id. at 587-88 (holding that Congress "may allocate competitive funding ac-
cording to criteria that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a
criminal penalty at stake").
1 See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983)
(citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (holding that Con-
gress is not required to subsidize expression through lobbying)).
See Epstein, supra note 105, at 35.
Even though private funding of the arts may not be adequate within the art
community... still when corporate and private giving are available, you still
have enough alternative sources of money, so you really cannot say that un-
less you have public money, all art, all commerce, and all creativity will cease.
Id.; but see Beverly Wolff, supra note 105, at 29:
Unfortunately, there is no legal obligation for the federal government to fund
the arts- there is no fundamental right to this subsidy. However, I find the
argument that we would all be... better off without the NEA to be very prob-
lematic.... [ThIs seriously ignores the role that the NEA has played over the
last 25 years in the arts community.... There are so many people, so many
emerging artists, so many arts programs that wouldn't exist without the NEA.
and I think that it's very specious to assume that the corporate world could fill
this gap or that private funders could.
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IV. CONCLUSION
A. The Constitutional Threat of Censorship and the Arts
There is ample support for both the constitutionality and
the unconstitutionality of decency as a condition on federal
grant money." The nexus of the debate is whether the
viewer sees the question as primarily one of discretionary
congressional spending, or as one of censoring artists' free-
dom of expression. The majority in Finley chose to ignore a
decency requirement's probable effects on certain artistic
viewpoints (i.e. no federal money) and instead found section
954(d)(1) constitutional on narrow, technical grounds. As
Justices Scalia and Souter were quick to observe, however.
the danger of censorship cannot reasonably be overlooked as
the likely practical consequence.
Given the ostensible danger of direct or self-censorship
which could result from conditions on federal grants and the
necessity of having some rational means of allocating finite
resources, the decency provision is a worrisome, albeit per-
fectly constitutional, piece of legislation. If Finley signals the
Court's willingness to allow Congress wide reign over the na-
tional purse strings, the NEA, in its current form, will occupy
an odd position in the art world. Originally founded to foster
the arts in America, the NEA can now conceivably be used as
a tool for favoritism, depending on the composition of Con-
gress and the NEA review board.
B. The Federal Government's Future in Arts Funding
The effects of Finley will not be fully known for some time.
While William J. Ivey, Chairman of the National Endowment
for the Arts felt that the Court's decision in Finley would fi-
nally allow the NEA to return to business as usual," only
history will be able to accurately gauge the full effects of the
Court's recent decision. If the art world becomes dissatisfied
with an organization that dictates the favored mode of artistic
164 See e.g., Epstein, supra note 105, at 34-36 (summarizing the First Amendment
arguments made for and against the constitutionality of decency restrictions on arts
funding, and concluding that both sides' arguments are compelling).
16. "Today's decision is an endorsement of the Endowments mission to nurture the
excellence, vitality and diversity of the arts and a reaffirmation of the agency's dis-
cretion in funding the highest quality art in America. We anticipate that the Court's
ruling will not affect our day-to-day operations." See Statement by William J. Ivey.
Chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts in Response to the Supreme Court
Decision in Finley v. NEA (Jan. 15. 1999)
<http://arts.endow.gov/endownews/news98 /Statement6-25.html>.
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expression, then the NEA may be short-lived. The danger of
censorship can be overcome by simply taking the federal gov-
ernment out of the arts business. If Finley indicates that the
NEA may be doomed to act as a mere function of the vacil-
lating political views of Congress, then perhaps it is time to
revise the practice and implementation of public arts funding.
Since artistic taste is inherently subjective, reasonable al-
tematives to the current NEA include a return to strictly pri-
vate arts funding, a reliance on the current federal income
tax deduction for charitable contributions" in lieu of the
NEA, or a tax credit that would be slightly more generous
than the current deduction. By placing primary responsibil-
ity for arts funding in the hands of individuals, the censor-
ship danger will disappear. Artists would be free to create as
they wish and appeal to their particular audience for support.
Artists would not need to conform to any grant conditions as
under the current NEA scheme. Unless and until artists ac-
cept strings on federal money, the NEA will be susceptible to
censorship attacks. If these complaints fall on deaf Supreme
Court ears, the best way to battle the danger of censorship
will be to circumvent the NEA rather than attempt a full
frontal attack. As Finley illustrates, for now, the latter strat-
egy will not work.167
1 See Epstein, supra note 105, at 36-37 (outlining his solution to the federal
grant conundrum: a grant-matching program whereby the government would con-
tribute 28% of an artist's total grant with no conditions attached, provided that the
artist could first raise the remaining 72% from private sources).
See id. at 37 ("So I shall leave with the following conclusion. If conditional sub-
sidies for art are unconstitutional, and if total subsidies for art are unconstitutional,
then my own preferred position- no public money for art- may just be the source
of constitutional wisdom after all.").
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